Introduction
The Supreme Court, as the highest judicial body, plays an unparalleled role in the legal system of any society; its founding philosophy and objectives are a function of the historical, social, and legal perspectives of each nation. This article presents practical recommendations for reforming the structure of Iran’s Supreme Court and strengthening its unifying and developmental role, drawing upon comparative experiences. The present study is an endeavor to re-examine the role of the Supreme Court in Iran’s transition toward legal development and the institutionalization of justice at the macro-judicial level.
Method
This article analyzes Iran’s Supreme Court using a comparative, analytical, and critical methodology based on documentary and library research.
Conclusions
A comparative study of the objectives of supreme courts in various legal systems provides a robust foundation for evaluating the status and function of this institution in Iran. The findings of this study indicate that a Supreme Court is not merely a ceremonial body or a high-level appellate court, but rather a fundamental pillar for ensuring the coherence of the legal system and for the development and adaptation of the law to societal exigencies. However, the evolutionary path of Iran’s Supreme Court reveals a significant divergence and gap when compared to successful global counterparts. In the American legal system, the Supreme Court is the “helmsman of legal evolution” and the principal determinant of the nation’s legal trajectory. By accepting only a small percentage of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has become a quasi-legislator, possessing the capacity for effective intervention in fundamental issues and social evolutions, as demonstrated in the seminal case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), where it succeeded in completely transforming the course of American constitutional theories.
In France, inspired by the principles of the 1789 Revolution, the ultimate aim of the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) is to guarantee the principle of equality of persons before the law. The raison d’être of this institution is to resolve interpretive differences and to standardize the application of law for all individuals and in all cases. Consequently, the system of appeal (pourvoi en cassation) in France is open and accessible, allowing even low-value claims to be brought before the high court. Although the traditional structure and the “quashing” (cassation) nature of the court have prevented its extensive engagement with the merits of cases, the future trajectory of its evolution is toward an expansion of its substantive powers. In Germany, the historical ordeal of the Third Reich and the lessons learned from the perils of separating the judiciary from law-making led the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) to adopt both fundamental functions—developing the law in response to societal needs and preserving legal unity and equality—as its paramount objectives. The creative role of the judge and the emphasis on a dynamic and socially oriented interpretation are among the most prominent features of the German legal system.
In Iran, despite drawing inspiration from Western models in establishing the Supreme Court and articulating the goal of ensuring equality in the laws of the Constitutional (Mashruteh) period and thereafter, the institution has not succeeded in realizing its objectives in practice. The unregulated proliferation of divisions (fifty-two active divisions in recent years) has not only failed to resolve conflicts but has turned the Court itself into a source of contradictory, conflicting, and divergent rulings. Indeed, a phenomenon that can be termed “structural autoimmunity”—wherein the Court acts against its own unity—constitutes the primary obstacle to the Supreme Court’s fulfillment of its unifying role. The multiplicity of divisions, the lack of precedential coherence, and the extensive rotation of judges have rendered the authenticity of divisional rulings dependent on individuals rather than the institution of the Court. Furthermore, the dual educational tracks (seminarian and university) have created a heterogeneous scholarly background within the Court, which exacerbates procedural and interpretive disagreements. This is compounded by the fact that the expansion of divisions to various cities (such as Qom and Mashhad at one point) has further rendered meaningless the necessity of centralization, unity, and the exercise of the Court’s moral authority.
Ultimately, the “Supreme Court of Iran” must be redefined as the vibrant heart of coherence, evolution, and justice in the Iranian legal system—an institution whose mission is to produce and stabilize uniform interpretations so that the law is predictable, transparent, and similarly applied for all. In its current state, the Iranian Supreme Court is more of a superior appellate court than a Supreme Court in the true sense of the word.